Her available publications include T he Abolitionist Approach: Although Regan's theory represents an important contribution that differs qualitatively from Singer's theory of animal liberation, there is a sense in which any coherent and non-speciesist theory of animal rights must rule out all forms of institutional exploitation.
We can intend such a result, and we can even execute such an intention so that it becomes a trying, without in fact either causing or even risking it. Rather than calling for an amendment of the current system of animal use, this rights perspective leads to abolitionism: The respect principle states simply that no individual with equal inherent value may be treated solely as a means to an end in order to maximize the aggregate of desirable consequences.
The first component is what the theory ideally seeks. Consequentialists are of course not bereft of replies to these two criticisms.
It seemingly justifies each of us keeping our own moral house in order even at the expense of the world becoming much worse. Fourth, there is what might be called the paradox of relative stringency.
He argues that utilitarianism does not start with rules but with goals and thus has greater normative specificity because actions are prescribed or proscribed based on "the extent to which they further these goals.
In such cases, rights theory may become more complicated because criteria would need to be devised to decide what to do when rights conflict. The last possible strategy for the deontologist in order to deal with dire consequences, other than by denying their existence, as per Taurek, is to distinguish moral reasons from all-things-considered reasons and to argue that whereas moral reasons dictate obedience to deontological norms even at the cost of catastrophic consequences, all-things-considered reasons dictate otherwise.
I have elsewhere argued that incremental change is arguably consistent with rights theory as long as the incremental change represents a prohibition of some significant form of institutionalized exploitation, and when the prohibition recognizes that nonhumans have at least some interests outside of those that must be recognized in order to exploit the animals that cannot be traded away irrespective of the consequences for human beings.
This trade is generally permissible even when the animal interest involved is significant and the human interest is admittedly trivial, as is the case of the use of animals for "entertainment" purposes such as pigeon shoots, rodeos, or circuses. Rollin claims that in the United States, "we have never had a social and moral revolution that was not incremental.
Indeed, Singer has acknowledged that under some circumstances, it would be permissible to use nonconsenting humans in experiments if the benefits for all affected outweighed the detriment to the humans used in the experiment.
Oxford University Press, 2nd edition. And in assessing the culpability of risky conduct, any good consequences must be discounted, not only by the perceived risk that they will not occur, but also by the perceived risk that they will be brought about by a using; for any such consequences, however good they otherwise are, cannot be considered in determining the permissibility and, derivatively, the culpability of acts Alexander Most people regard it as permissible and perhaps mandatory to switch the trolley to the siding.
Singer, Animal Liberation, supra note 16, at If I only ask for the book in order to appear nice and hope that my friend is likely to do more things for me in the future, then I am still treating him as a means only.
For this view too seeks to appropriate the strengths of both deontology and consequentialism, not by embracing both, but by showing that an appropriately defined version of one can do for both.
Similarly, rights theory is reasonably clear concerning the "micro" component of moral theory. But because animal interests are treated in a completely instrumental manner, and all animal interests may be sacrificed if animal owners decide that there is a benefit in doing so, then the animal will virtually always be on the short end of the stick because we will almost always presume that property owners are the best judges of whether a particular use of their property, including their animal property, will be a "benefit" to them.
Indeed, it can Deontological perspective animal rights shown that the sliding scale version of threshold deontology is extensionally equivalent to an agency-weighted form of consequentialism Sen It is unclear whether Singer believes that the individual moral agent should pursue the action that will have the best overall consequential effect, or whether he requires only that the agent seek to educe suffering and minimize pain.
For more information, please see the entry on moral dilemmas. The patient-centered version of deontology is aptly labeled libertarian in that it is not plausible to conceive of not being aided as being used by the one not aiding.
Regan unambiguously and without equivocation condemns the use of animals for food, hunting, trapping, testing, education, and research.
This narrowness of patient-centered deontology makes it counterintuitive to agent-centered deontologists, who regard prohibitions on killing of the innocent, etc. As long as we can kill animals for food, or use them in experiments, or imprison them for their entire lives in cages so that we can be amused at zoos, or maim them for our amusement in rodeos, or shoot them for fun at yearly pigeon shoots, then, to say that animals have rights is, as Shue observed, using "rights" "in some merely legalistic or otherwise abstract sense compatible with being unable to make any use of the substance of the right.
This matter of inclusion is to be distinguished from the matter of the scope of any rights that animals may have once we move them from one side to the other. I believe that people should not be turning to veganism because they hate women or because they stereotype people of color.
The second component provides normative guidance to the individual, on a personal level, in terms of what theory ideally requires.Bringing animal ethics back in: one could imagine an original position that includes nonhuman animals, such that those in the original position would be more inclined to pick a society that treats sentient animals well, whether due to a stewardship mentality or a rights-based ethos.
Animal ethics is the systematic study of how we ought to treat animals and therefore is central to animal rights. "Thinking through, critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I believe, the chief task of philosophy, and it is this task that makes philosophy a worthwhile activity.".
A (strong) deontological animal ethic ultimately aims at the abolition of nonhuman animal use and exploitation in agriculture, entertainment, science and medical research, the fur industry, and so forth. The aim is not ‘‘reformation’’ of current practices or ‘‘reduced’’ suffering: the aim is complete abolition.
The Case for Animal Rights is a book by the American philosopher Tom Regan, in which the author argues that at least some kinds of non-human animals have moral rights because they are the "subjects-of-a-life," and that these rights adhere to them whether or not they are recognized.
Rights theories: the general approach. Rights theories maintain that there are things we cannot do against individuals, because they are holders of moral rights.
Having a right means having a special protection. It means that an interest that the right defends should not be frustrated. For example, in The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that theoretical and empirical considerations indicate that at least some animals (normal mammals of at least one-year of age) possess beliefs, desires, memory, perception, intention, self-consciousness, and a sense of the future.Download